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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of the maintenance activity, in a nuclear power plant (NPP) is to 
maintain the operational reliability and the economic value of the nuclear installation 
so that the power production can continue as long as planned. The maintenance work 
in nuclear power plants is varied by its nature. It requires traditional craftsman skills 
as well as analytical understanding about the different failure mechanisms, the 
operating principles of the power plant and e.g. condition monitoring techniques.  
The maintenance personnel seem to carry a strong craftsman identity. Attending to 
the machinery, for example when conducting fault repairs, is a crucial source of job 
motivation. The motivating aspect of the fault repairs partly stems from the fact that 
they are directly (and visibly) related to the overall goal of the organization; 
maintaining the operability of the plant. 
 
Maintenance has often been considered as mostly manual labor, which requires little 
or no mental work. This reflects also to maintenance being sometimes at the bottom 
of the hierarchy in terms of respect, influence and authority at the NPPs  
Although NPP maintenance work, and maintenance in general, suffers from a “dirty 
hands” image, the nature and significance of maintenance work should be better 
acknowledged in both research and practice [1].  In fact, in many aspects maintenance 
work is similar to so called knowledge work.   
 
Maintenance work in a nuclear power plant (NPP) aims at controlling hazards related 
to nuclear safety and guaranteeing the availability of equipment critical to production 
as well as safety. A significant part of nuclear plant events is attributable to failures 
that take place during maintenance and periodic testing. 
 
Human and organisational factors are frequently identified as making a major 
contribution to these events [2]. Despite this recognition, licensee and regulatory 
oversight in the human and organisational area has tended to focus sometimes more 
on operational matters than maintenance.  
 
2. Objective of the report 
Starting from the trends registered in the nuclear sector, in particular the aging of the 
workforce and the lost of knowledge, the report identifies the human and 
organisational factors appearing in maintenance activities. Suggestions for improving 
the human and organisational performances are also given. 
 
3. Trends affecting maintenance in the nuclear sector 
 
3.1 Lost of knowledge 
The nuclear power sector has recognized since time the importance of the 
preservation of nuclear knowledge in the coming years. Nuclear knowledge is 
threatened by two trends: the first concerning the choice of the new generations, the 
second concerning the workforce in the nuclear power sector. The decrease in the 
number of students choosing nuclear science and engineering is a phenomenon 
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observed since years; as a consequence, several universities have phased out the 
related training programs, whilst R&D activities in the nuclear sector have been 
decreased too. 
 
In the nuclear sector, the nuclear licensees world-wide are facing the ageing and the 
retirement within a few years of a significant part of their workforce, which makes for 
them very challenging to preserve the knowledge and the expertise related to the 
design, the operation and the maintenance of the nuclear power plants.  
 
The knowledge of employees is conventionally distinguished in two types: the 
explicit and the tacit knowledge. The first type, is the knowledge that can be 
verbalized, documented and codified (e.g. in the form of verbal instructions and 
training, training materials, procedures, reports). The second type, is the one 
accumulated during the work history, created during the many work situations the 
employee has been facing and the tasks she has been carrying out. This knowledge 
derives from practical know-how and manifests itself in action. It is considered non-
quantifiable and often it is unnoticed.  
 
In reality, explicit and tacit knowledge are not exclusive. In fact, they can be 
considered as the extremes of a continuum; furthermore, the distinction between the 
two is not static, considering that part of the tacit knowledge is converted in explicit 
knowledge (e.g by drafting new procedures), and part of the explicit knowledge is 
continuously transformed in tacit knowledge (e.g. by an employee or a team who 
implements a specific procedure) [3].  
 
A consequence of the lost of knowledge, as well as of the purpose of reducing staff 
costs, is the tendency to use the maintenance staff for performing a wider range of 
activities which would require more staff. For this purpose, many nuclear power 
plants are implementing programs of skill-broadening in maintenance, which provide 
the maintenance with additional skills. This practice has also the advantage to 
providing staff with new development opportunities. However, there is a risk of 
affecting the standard competences. Additional training of the less used competences 
is recommended, as well as the increase of supervision. 
 
 
3.2 Outsourcing of the maintenance services 
In the nuclear sector the increased recurrence to contractors for performing 
maintenance activities has been registered in the last fifteen years. Contractors can be 
small, locally-based companies or maintenance teams which provide outage servicing 
to many different NPPs, and which may work across different countries. When work 
is contracted out, the licensee must ensure adequate oversight of contractors by 
maintaining a suitable level of control and supervision and by maintaining an 
intelligent customer capability. In particular, the nuclear licensee, who is the 
responsible for safety, must ensure that the contractors work within the licensee’s 
work processes and rules. Several events have shown that this has not always been 
achieved, so increased oversight may be required. 
 
In general, the role of supervisors at the plant level becomes more important with the 
loss of experienced workers. In addition to technical skills, supervisors must be 
competent in dealing with people. It is important to introduce specific incentives, in 
such a way to motivate staff to move to more administrative tasks. In addition, 
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training programs are required to assist supervisors in developing their leadership and 
management skills. 
 
Contracting out and moving to skill-broadening are examples of organisational 
changes that are used to optimise the use of plant staff resources. Nevertheless, if 
inadequately conceived or implemented, they also have the potential to negatively 
impact on station performance. Organisational change processes are necessary to 
ensure that the safety significance of organisational changes are recognised and 
addressed.  
 
4 Human errors registered in maintenance activities 
 
Recent statistics carried out in the USA (INPO) [4] show that 40% of the failures at 
US NPPs are related to human factors: among them, 30% are related to engineering 
deficiencies and 30% to work performance during maintenance. 
 
An other interesting conclusion is that most of the significant events in the latter 
category have been triggered by the supplemental workers. Therefore the human in 
general and the contractor performance in particular become a crucial issue where 
many utilities are investing large effort for their reduction. 
 
Also supplier reliability is an issue: in many cases equipment were delivered with 
wrong or different specifications. 
 
It was noted by many participants to the above mentioned International Events that 
human errors and their minimization still lacks good models, including contractor 
performance, training effectiveness, work control, etc. 
 
In particular, the direct errors on equipment are classified as follows [5] :  
 
Error of Omission (missing human actions): 
 Restoration errors of operability after work, such as omission of the realignment 
of process or instrument valves, disconnectors, breakers, fuses, limit settings or 
blockings. Omission of refilling of fluid or gas into lines, tanks or draining at 
the end of work, 
 Disconnected cables or electronic components not reconnected, during work. 
Omission to install packing or adjusting device. Settings, adjustments, 
preventive maintenance or inspections omitted. 
 Foreign objects or impurities left behind inside the object of the work. Examples 
are dirt, garbage, metal shives, tools, scaffolds or covering material. 
 
Errors of Commission (wrong human actions): 
 
Wrong order or direction 
 Wrong order, such as cables or instrument pipelines crosswise connected, 
 Wrong direction, such as reversed or twisted installation of valve or another 
sub-component. Wrong positioning of valve. 
 
Wrong selection 
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 Wrong place or object, such as cabling fixed on wrong connection, setting of 
wrong tripping conditions, or draining of wrong pipeline. Item installed on 
wrong equipment place. 
 Wrong or mixed spare parts, parts, materials, tools, fluids or chemicals selected 
for work. Spare part, equipment or material or function deviates from design. 
 
Wrong settings/adjustments/calibrations 
 Wrong settings of trip limits, limit switches, reference, indication or time delay 
values, or of adjusting devices. Deficient alignment of shaft, stem/spindle or 
pipe. Wrong setting of pipe support or packing. 
 
Other maintenance quality problems 
 Too little force, e.g. loose connections of bolts, nuts, cables, terminals or 
sensors, 
 Too much force, e.g. excessive tightening or greasing, 
 Damaging other equipment e.g. cabling, cable trays or small diameter piping by 
falling material or slugging/contacting. Can be due to carelessness and narrow 
spaces for work or transport. 
 Other carelessness: e.g. worn tools, falling material, deficient weld, solder joint 
or insulation. Unclear trips initiated during testing, installation or maintenance. 
Wrong subtitling or recording. Wrong timing. 
 
5 An important issue:  the bending of rules 
 
Procedures and work instructions are required to guide work not only in operations 
but also in maintenance, and a culture of procedural compliance must be developed 
and nurtured in maintenance departments.  
In safety critical organizations, rules and procedures have the purpose to make the 
activities carried out by the employees more reliable. This view is based on the 
assumption that humans are prone to making mistakes. The purpose of rules and 
procedures is, then, to control these ‘human’ characteristics, erecting safety barriers to 
the troublesome variability of human performance [6].  Moreover, Dien [7] suggests 
that the rule designers often consider procedures as tools for controlling the worker, 
not as tools for allowing the worker to better control her work. 
Procedures must be technically accurate and written using human behaviour 
principles. The usability of procedures should be tested through verification by 
human factors experts, and validation activities, including walk-downs of the 
procedures in the plant. However, an appropriate balance must be maintained 
between procedural compliance and preserving a questioning attitude among plant 
staff. 
 
Several case studies have shown that most maintenance workers think that it is not 
possible for them to observe rules and procedures to the letter; they also think that it 
is not even possible to make rules that could be followed to the letter, and that the 
appliance of the rules depends on the situation [8].  These beliefs are rooted in the 
view that part of the professionalism of the maintenance technicians is to know how 
to interpret, apply and neglect the procedures so that the work can be carried out [1, 
9].   
Such attitude is in general perceived as potentially harmful for the safety and 
effectiveness of maintenance. However, it is worth to note that also the strong 
tendency to standardize and proceduralize the work may be experienced as reducing 
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the meaningfulness of the work, and as threat for job motivation and for the 
professional identity of many maintenance workers who see themselves as skilled 
craftsmen [7,1]. 
Oedewald & Reiman [9] have studied the phenomenon of rule violation. They noted 
that employees are more willing to bend the rules if the consequences are interpreted 
as being probabilistic, whilst they will carefully follow the rules carefully if they 
believe that the failure to comply with the rules or the violation will have inevitable 
deterministic consequences. Also for this reason it is recommended that the 
employees using the rules, in particular the field workers, participate in their creation 
so as to gain ownership of the instructions and the awareness of the consequences of 
non-compliance. 
In reality, it is difficult to ascertain if the effects of a violation are deterministic or 
probabilistic and under what conditions. Moreover, many rules include precautionary 
measures; in this way, the non-compliance should not lead to deterministic 
consequences unless redundant defences have been made inactive.  
Also good rules are sometimes broken, and not only by risk takers and sensation 
seekers. More important than to try to completely prevent violations and rule bending 
is to seek to understand the organisational causes that promote or force to act against 
the rules. For example, organizational culture and the structural elements of the work 
can be such that working strictly according to rules would in practice be impossible, 
as believed by many maintenance workers. The cultural dimension is evident in those 
cases where rule bending and violations is silently and implicitly accepted by the 
management, until the occurrence of a serious event.   
 
6 Elements affecting human and organisational 
performances 
 
6.1 Motivation  
Most of the maintenance workers interviewed have been proud of their job. They 
have seen maintenance work as very important for the plant safety. The maintenance 
work produced a feeling of meaningfulness, especially when there were technical 
problems to solve. 
 
The motivating aspect of the problems and fault situations is a paradox in the sense 
that one of the goals of maintenance is to avoid problems and keep the technology 
running reliably. This conception of maintenance work is not optimal in terms of 
fulfilling the maintenance task, where preventive maintenance, condition monitoring 
and analysis of the maintenance history of the equipment are important for keeping 
the production safe and reliable in the long run. As stated in IAEA [10], “constant 
repairs tend to create a firefighter mentality among the workers, which is further 
bolstered by both the feeling of satisfaction after the repairs are successfully 
completed and ‘rewards’ or praise following a job well done. These feelings contrast 
starkly with the otherwise mundane and systematic approach of preventive 
maintenance” [11]. 
 
The fact that a large proportion of the work is routine preventive maintenance is a 
challenge for the safety and reliability of the maintenance. Routine work decreases 
motivation [12] and can lead to lower quality or increased slips and lapses due to 
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inattention. Too much routine can be avoided by organizational practices e.g. by the 
division of the tasks and job rotation. More attention should be paid to offering 
learning opportunities and challenging jobs to all the workers. For example, 
modification projects and rare disturbance situations could be exploited better. In 
addition to their motivation enhancing effect the early acquiescence with the new 
equipment, for example, contributes to anticipating maintenance needs, including 
preventive and corrective maintenance [13]. 
 
6.2 Sense of responsibility 
The importance of a sense of personal responsibility for effective maintenance, and  
of a feeling of personal ownership for an equipment or an area of plant,  is suggested 
by several  studies [1,14]. Still, the meaning and content of personal responsibility in 
nuclear power plant domain have remained vague both in research and practice [9].  
The conditions necessary for obtaining the sense of personal responsibility in a 
complex sociotechnical system such as a NPP are seldom perfectly clear for the 
personnel or the management. In NPPs, the achievement of a sense of personal 
responsibility is complicated by strict rules, procedures, and a tendency to emphasize 
shared responsibility and collective action instead of individual initiative. 
There are different views about the opportunity to localise or spread responsibility in 
a NPP. For example, Schulman [15] argues that a localized responsibility can be 
dangerous in NPPs, because actions taken too soon, without a broad awareness of 
what is going on, can jeopardize other parts of the system. At the contrary, other 
scholars (e.g. [16]) think that the risk of having a diffusion of responsibility is a non 
clear identification of responsibility.  
From one side, the sense of responsibility enhances the motivation; from the other, 
the fact that a task is very important and safety relevant, brings the management to 
design and supervise the work with the purpose of ensuring performances without 
errors; this prescriptive attitude of management can be perceived as reducing or 
removing the individual choice and, consequently, destroy the feeling of 
responsibility and the motivation. 
The prescriptive attitude of management, on the other hand, is rooted in the 
awareness both of management and maintenance staff of the impossibility of 
translating in procedures all the aspects of the maintenance work; the limitations and 
sometimes the inadequacy of the procedures to cope with the reality are well known 
to the maintenance personnel [1,7], who, in general, considers that the knowledge on 
how to interpret, apply or neglect the procedures, in such a way that work can be 
carried out thoroughly and efficiently, is an important part of their professionalism [6, 
8].  
7 Approaches to enhance human performance in 
maintenance 
 
7.1 Planning of maintenance 
First of all, the utility is expected to have a maintenance strategy to define and justify 
the maintenance programme, eliminating tasks that are not required. This approach is 
likely to reduce the occurrence of human errors. The error prevention requires an 
effective planning of maintenance. Error prevention strategies differ between 
preventive and corrective maintenance, because preventive maintenance is more 
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affected by slips and lapses while corrective maintenance is prone to knowledge-
based errors and production-related pressures [2,8]. 
 
The planning of maintenance tasks must be realistic in order to reduce the risk of 
workers perceiving time pressures.   
Outages are usually moments of high workload with greater risks of time pressure, 
due to the perceived need to get the plant ready for start-up as soon as possible. The 
time pressure influences the task performance. Moreover, during the performance of 
maintenance tasks, the workforce may perceive that what is required by management 
is not consistent with management statements on the need to give paramount 
importance to safety. Successful planning and execution of plant maintenance 
requires strong communication between workers and supervisors, between 
maintainers and operators, and between contractors and plant staff. 
 
With the purpose of ensuring the effective planning, and good work scheduling, 
appropriate maintenance planning tools may be introduced in the work management 
systems. Such tools include: e.g. critical task analysis, pre-meetings to avoid 
conflicting jobs and priorities, walk-downs of complex or infrequently performed 
tasks.  
 
7.2 Organisational learning 
Post-job debriefings are a useful tool for identifying deficiencies and strengths in the 
work planning process and for learning lessons. There are many other ways for 
improving maintenance performance by promoting learning paths in the organization.  
 
For example, the reports on near misses and minor events provide valuable learning 
opportunities. For this reasons, maintenance workers must be encouraged to report. 
The root-cause analyses offer other opportunities for organizational learning, in 
particular if the experts carrying out root cause analysis carefully examine the human 
and organizational contributors to maintenance events.  Other sources are audits, self-
assessments and maintenance logs. 
 
 
7.3 Knowledge management and training in maintenance 
Training is one of the instruments for creating an awareness of hazards as well as 
sufficient skills for carrying out the work in a safe manner. An ongoing change of 
workforce generation calls for tools to analyze the existing know-how of the 
personnel in order to create effective training programs. Maintenance work in nuclear 
power plants is not routine-like activity which could be carried out just by following 
the procedures. It requires different types of skills and knowledge. Practical craftsman 
skills, overall understanding of the functioning of and couplings between the systems 
as well as technical knowledge about the materials and equipments are needed in 
maintenance work [1,17,18]. Thus, in addition to the tacit knowledge about 
maintenance practices and specific tasks, understanding of the theoretical basis of 
technical phenomena and work processes are essential contents of the know-how of 
the personnel.   
Long tenures, experience, and adequate training are often considered a proof of high 
competence in the nuclear area. However, long tenure and experience as such does 
not guarantee competence. Long tenure can also lead to routinisation. Experience is 
then no longer a benefit, but can actually be a source of errors when the work and its 
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outcomes are not actively reflected upon. Routine tasks are a major source of 
incidents. Furthermore, new technology, new job contents and working practices, and 
new safety and efficiency demands placed on maintenance set new requirements, 
which means that some of the old habits and out-dated conceptions have to be 
unlearned.  
There are a number of error management techniques in maintenance, including 
training, work planning, job cards, licence-to-work systems, licensing and 
certification, audits, procedures, disciplinary procedures, human resource 
management, and Total Quality Management. They note that these techniques have 
not been effective in preventing a steady rise in maintenance-related errors during the 
past decade. They comment of the techniques that “their limitations include being 
piecemeal rather than principled, reactive rather than proactive, and fashion-driven 
rather than theory-driven”.  
Human error prevention tool is a general term for the various techniques and 
approaches aiming to improve human performance by facilitating the prevention, 
discovery and recovery from human error. Human error prevention tools include the 
following [8]: 
- Peer checking 
- Three way communication 
- Pre and post job briefing 
- STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review, Communicate) 
- take two (minutes to think before acting) 
Human error prevention and human performance enhancement tools can provide a 
good way of facilitating the noticing of human factors in maintenance. However, the 
tools are only as good as their users, designers and implementers. The tools cannot 
compensate for a lack of understanding on technical issues or hazards, nor can they 
compensate for inadequate organizational processes or human resource management 
in terms 
 
7.4 To create conditions for working safely 
The maintenance work is changing in nature. Information technology is utilized in a 
larger extent and new maintenance strategies and methods are continuously 
introduced. However, the innovations have faced resistance from the field workers. 
Sometimes the management has considered this to indicate that the maintenance 
personnel are not motivated and committed to the organization. In reality most of the 
maintenance personnel are very committed to the work and the safety and functioning 
of the plant is important to them. New methods and tools should be introduced in a 
manner that allows the personnel to see the functional relevance and the safety 
relevance of the innovations. Further, new tools and working practices create new 
competence requirements. It takes time and practice to acquire sufficient confidence 
to be able to take care of the new tasks or to utilize the new methods effectively. 
More training resources and time for learning new methods and practices should be 
offered.  
Tools guide the way people think and work. For example, the measures used in 
condition monitoring define what information the worker will acquire and can utilise 
in his/her work. There exists also a variety of other tools than technical, for example 
documents and meetings. In order to utilise these tools effectively attention should be 
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paid to issues such as who needs to participate in different meetings and who have 
access to e.g. plant information systems. From the accuracy of the information point 
of view the technicians are usually the ones with the best knowledge of the plant. 
Usually, however, the reporting and documentation to information systems and in 
various meetings is conducted by other members (supervisor or engineers) in the 
organization. 
Division of the tasks should support the formation of an overall picture of the 
different activities in the maintenance organization as well as of the functioning of the 
plant. It seems that specialization to quite narrow responsibility areas has been typical 
in NPPs. But, from the organizational effectiveness point of view the “one man areas” 
may be fragile and inflexible. Due to that reason the organizations have started to 
emphasize e.g. teamwork and multiple skilled persons.  
According to Reiman [8] the experienced maintenance workers stress the importance 
of concentrating deeply in some technologies, not learning a little about everything. 
They stress the importance of the tacit knowledge in planning and developing the 
maintenance activities as well as in diagnosing the faults. 
Training needs of the maintenance workers should be checked systematically from 
time to time. Even the very experienced workers could benefit from basic plant 
technology training. They can for example diagnose an equipment failure correctly, 
still not understanding the mechanisms causing it. Or they can carry out an overhaul 
but they cannot explain the basis of it or remember the correct names of the 
components. This can be harmful when cooperating with other organizations or when 
teaching newcomers. 
More attention should be paid to offering learning opportunities and challenging jobs 
to all the workers. For example modification projects and rare disturbance situations 
could be exploited better. In addition to their motivation enhancing effect for example 
the early acquiescence with the new equipment contributes to anticipating 
maintenance needs (preventive and corrective maintenance). 
8 The role of the regulatory body 
 
Owing to the growing recognition of the importance of reliable human and 
organisational performance during maintenance, regulatory bodies are increasingly 
scrutinizing this area. For example, some countries require a formal treatment of 
human factors in the safety case for the plant (and modifications) to demonstrate that 
maintenance tasks are properly understood and supported. Suitable regulatory 
frameworks should oversee the challenges facing the industry, such as management 
of ageing plants and workforce, plant life extensions, deregulation, institutional 
changes, design of new plants and decommissioning. Common concerns identified by 
regulatory bodies include outsourcing, contractor management, maintenance of 
competency, communication, and work planning. 
 
Regulators are also able to promote good practices and document regulatory 
expectations on topics that may be new to the industry, such as the trend towards 
increasing use of contractors which has increased the focus on maintenance of 
“intelligent customer capability”. Many regulators are working to ensure that their 
activities are planned using a risk-informed approach. However, there are differences 
between countries in their views on the extent to which the regulator should engage 
with the licensee to influence its safety management system [8]. 
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9 Conclusions  
Motivated and competent maintenance work force is a key prerequisite of nuclear 
safety. Maintenance organizations should consider the meaningfulness of work and 
clarify the significance of the more ordinary tasks to the reliability of plant 
performance. Maintenance organizations should encourage sense of personal 
responsibility for the safety of the entire plant and a feeling of professional pride. 
Further, maintenance organizations should strive to make their contribution to the 
overall functioning of the plant clearer by pointing out the unique knowledge 
maintenance acquires of plant condition. 
Maintenance organizations should clearly communicate differences in the importance 
that different rules have for safety and that the organizations regularly monitor the 
gap between work as officially described and work as actually conducted. Further, the 
rationale for the different rules and procedures should be thought of and explained to 
the personnel. 
Maintenance organizations and maintenance work is undergoing a lot of changes. 
Human and organizational factors and the specific organizational culture should be 
given the attention warranted by their significance.  
Training that maintains expertise is needed throughout working life. Both 
experienced and less experienced employees need to review the fundamentals from 
time to time.  
The maintenance organizations should discuss the ways in which they learn as 
individuals and as a collective. Learning should strive to challenge the assumptions 
and conceptions concerning hazards and safety, but also to make improvement to the 
existing practices. Incidents and errors should be seen as opportunities for learning 
about the functioning of the organization and about its current vulnerabilities, not as 
opportunities for blaming individuals.  
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